Even though the imperial examinations did not save the Song Dynasty--the second half of the dynasty saw China move south and shrink in size by half (see map), and it was ultimately brought to an end by the Mongols, the imperial examinations as a tool for the government to select officials was picked up again in the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644), and the subsequent Qing Dynasty (1644-1911). Many Chinese historians argue that the imperial examination system promoted social mobility in Chinese society. It was true that the imperial examinations provided a venue for even the humblest Chinese boy (as girls were not allowed to take part in it) as it required no pre-requisites to take the prefectural/county level examination, and tested mostly understanding and exposition on the classics, something every literate person could read and prepare for. The seeming democratic nature of the imperial examinations even led French philosophers of the 18th century to use the examinations as an example of the virtue of Chinese government, in contrast to the autocracy of the French king.

Benjamin Elman, a leading expert on classical Chinese education and the imperial examination system, argues that after its initial revolution of weakening aristocratic rule through selection of commoners to administrative positions by the examination system, the latter largely reproduced the elite top of society. Control of the number of successful candidates was through a quota system. Each Chinese province was given quotas ranging from 1 to 30 or 40, for the highest level of the imperial examinations, with the southern provinces, especially those on the eastern sea coast, taking the largest quotas because they produced more qualifying candidates. Quotas were adjusted over the centuries depending on the need of the government and the number of positions available. Thus the imperial examination system helped reproduce the ruling elite through what seemed like a meritocratic selection process of candidates who were well versed in the Confucian classics.

Elman also argues that the imperial examinations also reproduced Chinese social elites--most successful candidates came from families who had already produced successful candidates in the past. And successful government officials became large landed gentry after they retired from office and went back to their hometowns. They could afford to have their descendents go on to private schooling at home tutorials free of work while they hired labor to work their land. Wealthy merchants would often also invest in their sons' education to prepare them for the imperial examinations and government office. Thus the wealthy merchants and land owners had a better chance to have their sons succeed in the imperial examinations because they had more time preparing, while poor farmers' sons had to work all day. This argument has some merits but is perhaps more extreme than the actual situation, because poor people did have a chance to succeed for one reason or another, ambition, hard work, affiliation to rich people either by lineage or residence.

The imperial examination system also helped to produce and reproduce a uniform culture, in a vast area, both old and newly conquered, including a uniform written language, and commonly shared Confucian classics. It certainly facilitated government administration. The problem was, even though the imperial examination system was effective to a great extent in perpetuating civil administration in China, in the late Qing Dynasty, it was antiquated in the face of professionalism, industrializaiton, and technological advancements in the Western countries. That was why ultimately, in 1905, it was replaced by a modern educational system.